

A Theory of Government Procrastination*

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Abstract

We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient procrastination of socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term benefits. However, procrastination is often not indefinite even as we consider an infinite-horizon game. There exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and in many cases carried out to completion in finite time. When the net social benefit is large, there is no procrastination problem. When the net social benefit is small, the policy can be procrastinated indefinitely, though there may co-exist some gradual implementation equilibria. When the net social benefit is intermediate in magnitude, there are all sorts of procrastination equilibria, including gradual implementation. The theory predicts that a government with a more strongly predominant party tends to procrastinate less.

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1 Introduction

People often procrastinate about doing things that yield long-lasting benefits but carry an upfront cost, to the detriment of their long-term interests. Quitting bad habits, such as smoking and drinking, is one prominent example. Other examples include house-cleaning, studying for an examination, and writing a referee report. A recent literature (e.g., Akerlof, 1991 and O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) explains this phenomenon by focusing on the existence of present-biased preferences. A present-biased individual's relative preference for payoff at an earlier date over that of a later date gets stronger as these dates approach. These preferences are time-inconsistent, as a cost that appeared to be small yesterday from a present-discount perspective looms large today, while the future benefits appear to be about the same. As a result, a task that appeared to be worth doing today when evaluated as of yesterday becomes unworthy of doing when today arrives, leading to repeated delay. A present-biased individual who is (partially) naive to her own time-inconsistency may procrastinate about completing a task forever, even though it is in her best long-term interest to complete the task immediately.

Similarly, it is often observed that politicians procrastinate about implementing socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-lasting benefits. For example, it is widely believed that the federal government and local governments of the U.S. underinvest in public infrastructure: many bridges need to be repaired, and many stretches of highway need to be renovated. The burst of the dyke in New Orleans in 2005 as a result of hurricane Katrina is a case in point. The public was aware of the potential risk of not strengthening the dyke, and it was clearly a socially beneficial project, yet the government did not act for many years. Another example is that politicians are reluctant to raise income taxes even though it may benefit citizens in the long-run by helping to reduce the government deficit and hence lower the long-term interest rate. The delay of trade liberalization, despite its long-term benefits to the country as a whole, can be explained by the fact that the costs of resource reallocation (such as unemployment of workers) are incurred immediately while social benefits (of lower prices of imported goods for domestic consumers) are spread far into

the future. Yet another prominent example of government procrastination is that of pension reform. As Feldstein (2005) states, “[m]any economists and policy analysts acknowledge the long-run advantages of shifting from a pay-as-you go [tax-financed] system to a mixed system [that combines pay-as-you-go benefits with investment-based personal retirement account] but believe that the transition involves unacceptable costs. This is often summarized by saying that the transition generation would have to pay ‘double’ — once to finance the social security benefits of current retirees and again to save for its own retirement.” This might explain why many countries delay pension reform.

In this paper, we provide a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty inherent in a two-party political system. We assume that a party has the same time preferences as a typical citizen — which is characterized by geometric discounting — if the party believes it will be in office in every future period. Its discount factor between any two consecutive periods is constant, and its utility function does not give rise to time-inconsistency.¹ However, under a two-party political system, the ruling party becomes present-biased and time-inconsistent. Present-bias arises because a party’s probability of getting elected in the future is less than one, and because it puts more weight on the flow of net social benefit resulting from the policy when it is in office than when it is out of office. As a result, the ruling party in a two-party system often procrastinate about implementing socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term benefits. Specifically, we consider a divisible policy with a positive present discounted value (pdv) of net social benefits, and demonstrate that, depending on the cost of the policy relative to the pdv of future benefits, the government may (i) implement the policy immediately, exactly in accordance with citizens’ interests, (ii) procrastinate somewhat, but still implement the policy to completion in finite time, (iii) implement the policy gradually over many periods, with the process continuing indefinitely, or (iv) fail to implement any part of the policy.

In a multi-party political system, the policy implementation game that determines when

¹By making this assumption, we rule out government procrastination resulting from differences in the discount factor between the political parties and the citizenry or among the political parties themselves.

a socially beneficial policy is implemented differs in one fundamental way from a game between the present self and the future selves that determines when a task is carried out. The multi-party policy implementation game is played by the current ruling party against its own future selves as well as the future selves of the rival parties. Nonetheless, we find that there are features of the equilibria that resemble those of a game played by a present self against her own future selves. When the parties are symmetric, we can even interpret the political game as one played by a party's present self against its own future selves.

Indefinite procrastination of socially beneficial policies can sometimes be explained by a model of myopic government who cares more about current constituents and discounts heavily future unborn generations. That is, the government discounts future more heavily than the typical citizen but they both remain time-consistent. In this kind of setting, the government has incentives to procrastinate about implementing a socially beneficial policy indefinitely if and only if the government discounts future sufficiently heavier than the citizens. Since the government remains time-consistent, the policy is either implemented in its entirety immediately or procrastinated indefinitely depending on the government's discount factor. Thus, such models cannot explain why governments sometimes implement a policy only gradually. On the contrary, ours is not a model of myopia. Instead, it is a model of endogenous time-inconsistency of the political parties. A present-biased ruling party may not want to implement the policy now, but may wish a future ruling party would implement the policy; such time-inconsistency never occurs for myopic governments. The outcome of the model is also different from that of myopic government in that there exist equilibria in which, despite certain degree of procrastination, a socially beneficial policy is implemented and carried out to completion in finite time even as we consider an infinite-horizon game. Thus, our analysis reveals the distinction between two sources of procrastination by governments. The first arises from the government being more impatient than the citizens, i.e. a myopic government. The second arises from present-bias as political parties face uncertainty about the prospect of being elected and put more weight on the flow of net social benefit when they are in office. In this paper, we focus on the second source, which is the more

interesting one.

We shall assume that it is feasible for a policy to be partially implemented by a government. For example, a government can choose to partially liberalize the trade regime by cutting only some tariffs, or lowering tariffs somewhat but not all the way to free-trade level. In the case of balancing the budget, a government can choose to reduce the deficit somewhat but not all the way to a balanced budget. Our analysis shows that the possibility of partially implementing the policy enables the government to bypass the fate of indefinite procrastination of the policy even when the net social benefit is small. Seen in this light, this paper identifies a new source of gradualism in the literature on dynamic contribution to a public good, namely the present-bias of ruling parties inherent in a two-party political system.²

Our paper is related to the work of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Amador (2003). In their studies of government debt, they argue that the government saves too little, or accumulates too much debt, due to the political uncertainty caused by the two-party system. Amador (2003) observes that the time-inconsistency with which the government is faced is equivalent to the problem faced by a present-biased consumer. In contrast, our paper explains the mechanism through which a ruling party comes to have present-biased preferences in a two-party political system and how this affects the dynamic inefficiency of the policy implementation of the government as one entity. To make the model as general as possible, we have introduced asymmetries in our model: everything else being equal, the parties have asymmetric probabilities of being elected; moreover, the same party has different probabilities of being elected when it is an incumbent as opposed to being a non-incumbent.³ Finally,

²Compte and Jehiel (2004), for example, obtain endogenous gradualism in a contribution game by assuming that raising a player's contribution in the negotiation phase increases the other player's outside option value. Each player gradually makes contributions to prevent their respective partner from terminating the game.

³In our model, the election outcome is characterized by a Markov process, such that the current ruling party will be re-elected with an exogenous probability between 0 and 1. Moreover, that probability can be different for the two parties. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Amador (2003), however, assume that every party has an equal probability of being elected in every election. That is a special case of ours, when the probability of being re-elected equals one half for both parties. Although Alesina and Tabellini (1990) mention in a footnote of their paper that the analysis can be extended to a similar framework to ours, they have not explored how the likelihood of being re-elected affects the government present-bias as much as we do in this paper.

instead of applying the model to a specific policy issue, we analyze a more general setting, which can be further refined for analyzing specific policy issues.

Alesina and Drazen (1991) explain the delay in fiscal stabilization by a game of war of attrition between two heterogeneous socio-economic groups with conflicting distributional objectives. Stabilization is delayed because there is a stalemate in which the groups try to shift the burden of the policy change onto each other. The game in the present paper can be viewed partly as a game of war of attrition between the two parties. Each party is reluctant to preside over the initial adjustment period (when the cost of the policy is paid), which citizens dislike. So, each ruling party has incentives to procrastinate, hoping that the other party would implement in the future. As a result, the socially beneficial policy is implemented immediately only if the cost is sufficiently low. Otherwise, there is always some form of procrastination. Procrastination can take the form of one party always procrastinating when in office while the other always implementing when in office, or each party implementing a fraction of the remainder of the policy when in office (if the cost is intermediate), or both parties always procrastinating when in office (if the cost is high). Our difference with Alesina and Drazen (1991) is that there is no need for the two parties to be heterogeneous in any way for procrastination to occur in equilibrium. The above procrastination equilibria exist even when the two parties are perfectly symmetric.

There is one form of procrastination in this model that is not related to war of attrition, but purely the consequence of the present-bias of the parties. It is an equilibrium in which each party, when in office, implements a fraction of the remainder of the policy. As a result, the policy is implemented gradually. The motivation of this form of procrastination is not to shift the burden of the cost of the policy, but to be able to sustain a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all future ruling parties have incentive to implement a fraction of the remainder of the policy. Knowing this, the current ruling party has an incentive to implement a fraction of the remainder of the policy today, even though the party's present discounted utility derived from its own action is negative. This type of equilibrium exists because the current ruling party obtains positive welfare if the policy is implemented some date in the

future, but it obtains negative welfare if it implements today.

Our theory predicts that a government with a more predominant party tends to procrastinate less. Thus a government with a overwhelming majority party tends to implement socially desirable reforms more quickly. It also predicts that the predominant party procrastinates less than the predominated party, or that the party that perceives itself to predominate in the future tends to procrastinate less than the one that perceives itself to be predominated in the future. Finally, it predicts that socially desirable policies are often implemented gradually, especially when no party clearly predominate the other. These are all testable hypotheses.

The setup of our model is somewhat similar to that of the political switching model of Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) though theirs is a more nuanced Markov process. Besley and Coate (1998), Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Azzimonti (2005), Bai and Lagunoff (2008), and the recent literature on endogenous voting franchise (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)) all look at how dynamic inconsistencies can arise from change in political power. Unlike the current paper, the present-bias in these papers arises because changes in the governments action influence the type and degree of political uncertainty. In other words, the dynamic inconsistency is endogenous. Many of the papers on endogenous voting franchise use some form of dynamic inconsistency to yield results on the timing and/or degree of gradualism of reform, just as in the present paper. Endogenous time-inconsistency in government's decisions is not new. But what distinguishes the present paper from the rest of the literature is the existence of gradual reform resulting from political uncertainty, either as a consequence of a non-cooperative equilibrium or a cooperative equilibrium.

In section 2, we lay down the basic assumptions and setup of the model. We consider a socially beneficial policy that carries an upfront cost and yields long-lasting flows of benefits. Given that two parties compete for office in each period, the party currently in office plays a game with all future ruling parties (including its future selves) in choosing the fraction of the policy to be implemented today. In section 3, we explain why there is incentive for

a ruling party to procrastinate. In section 4, we compute the subgame perfect equilibria corresponding to different implementation costs. In section 5, we summarize the results and conclude.

2 Preliminaries

There are two political parties, A and B , that seek control of the government. One of them is in office in period $t \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$. Let each period be a term. Each party discounts future with a discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1)$, which is the same as the discount factor of a representative citizen.

The selection of the party in office in each election is characterized by a Markov process, such that the probability that a party is elected in an election is dependent only on who is currently in office. Specifically, the probability that party A is re-elected in the next election if it is currently in office is ϕ^A , while the probability that party B is re-elected if it is currently in office is ϕ^B . Since there are only two parties, the probability that one party wins is equal to the probability that the other party loses. Therefore, ϕ^A and ϕ^B are the only two parameters needed to fully describe the Markov process. We shall analyze this Markov process in detail in the next section. We have assumed for simplicity that the probability that a party is elected is independent of how the policy is implemented by the party or its rival. This is clearly a limitation. But this assumption allows us to focus on the issue of interest and to present our main findings transparently. Moreover, it enables us to conduct a simple analysis concerning how party predominance affects the policy implementation outcome when such predominance is exogenously given.⁴

The policy that we consider is about implementing a policy that involves an immediate implementation cost of c but generates a constant benefit flow of 1 in the current period and every future period. We assume that the policy is divisible in the sense that a ruling party can choose to implement only a fraction of the policy in its term so that a fraction

⁴It is often the case that party predominance is quite exogenous for historical reasons. Examples are the Liberal Democratic Party in post-war Japan, the People's Action Party in post-independence Singapore, and the Congress Party in post-independence India.

a_t of the policy undertaken in period t poses an upfront cost $a_t c$ to society while generating benefit flows of a_t in each future period. We assume that $1/(1 - \delta) > c$, so the policy is worth implementing from the citizens' point of view.

The flow of utility enjoyed by citizens in period t is assumed to be equal to the flow of net social benefit resulting from the policy in that period, which is given by

$$u_t = \sum_{k=0}^t a_k - a_t c.$$

The first term on the right-hand side shows the flow of benefit that society enjoys in period t from the fraction of the policy that has been implemented, whereas the second term represents the flow of cost that society incurs from the part of the policy implemented in period t . Therefore, citizens's welfare function at time t is

$$W_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k u_{t+k}.$$

We assume that the party in office in period t places a (normalized) weight of one on the flow of net social benefit in period t , and so its flow of utility in period t equals u_t , while the opposition party puts a weight of $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ on the flow of net social benefit in the same period.⁵ In other words, a party puts more weight on the flow of net social benefit when it is in power than when it is not. This differential weighting is motivated by the presumption that the ruling party's welfare function is a weighted sum of the citizens's welfare and its own welfare (α is the weight put on social welfare and $1 - \alpha$ is the weight put on the party's welfare). We suppose the ruling party derives some flow of private benefits (costs) spilled over from a positive (negative) flow of net social benefit during its term. Moreover, the flow of private benefits, which can be negative, is assumed to be proportional to the flow of net social benefit. For example, when the ruling party presides over a larger positive (negative) flow of net social benefit, citizens are better (worse) off, and are therefore more (less) willing to accommodate higher government spending during its term. This in turn increases (decreases) the amount of resources available to the ruling party to pursue its own

⁵The model can easily be accommodated to the case where the parties have different values of α . We assume that they have the same value of α only to simplify the exposition.

agenda during that period.⁶

Let p_k^i denote the probability that party i currently in office will also be in office k periods later, and consider the case in which the flow of net social benefit u_{t+k} in every future period $t+k$ does not depend on which party is in office in period $t+k$. Then, it follows from our discussion above that the welfare function for party i when it is in office in period t is given by

$$U_t^i = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k [p_k^i + (1 - p_k^i)\alpha] u_{t+k} \equiv \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i u_{t+k} \quad (1)$$

This can be interpreted as saying that the utility flow accrued to ruling party i is equal to the flow of utility to the citizens in each period, but the party's discount factor differs from that of the citizens in each period because of political uncertainty and selfishness of the party, as discussed above. Recall that ϕ^i is the probability that party i is re-elected when it is currently in office. Define $s \equiv \phi^A + \phi^B$. Clearly, $s \in (0, 2)$. Henceforth, we shall assume that $1 < s < 2$, which corresponds to the existence of an incumbent advantage in election.

For concreteness, let us suppose for now that party A is in office in the current period. We derive below the probability that the current ruling party will also be in office k periods later and show that it converges to a steady state probability as k becomes large. First, note that the probability that party A will be in office $k+1$ periods later can be linked to the probability that party A is in office k periods later, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} p_{k+1}^A &= \phi^A p_k^A + (1 - \phi^B)(1 - p_k^A) \\ &= (1 - \phi^B) + (s - 1)p_k^A, \end{aligned}$$

with $p_0^A = 1$. We can solve this difference equation explicitly to obtain

$$p_k^A = \frac{(1 - \phi^B) + (1 - \phi^A)(s - 1)^k}{2 - s}. \quad (2)$$

⁶Another way to motivate why a party puts more weight on the flow of net social benefit when in office is that the ruling party not only cares about the flow of net social benefit as a typical citizen, but it also cares more about it because delivering a larger flow of net social benefit while in office enhances its political status. On the contrary, while the opposition party cares about the flow of net social benefit as a typical citizen, it cares less about it because it treats the success of the ruling party as unfavorable, as it undermines its political status.

Define $p^A \equiv \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} p_k^A$. Then, it is clear that $p^A = \frac{\phi^A - (s-1)}{2-s}$. For $s \neq 1$, we can rewrite (2) as

$$p_k^A = p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^k \text{ for } k \geq 0. \quad (3)$$

Similarly, we have

$$p_k^B = 1 - p^A + p^A(s - 1)^k \text{ for } k \geq 0. \quad (4)$$

As we see from (3) and (4) (together with $0 < s < 2$) that p_k^A and p_k^B approach p^A and $1 - p^A$, respectively, as k becomes large. That is, p^A is the steady state probability that party A is in office. Without loss of generality, we assume that $p^A > 1/2$, or equivalently $\phi^A > \phi^B$. That is, we assume that party A is a predominant party.

As we see from (3), when viewed from date $t = 0$, the probability that party A is in office decreases over time from $p_0^A = 1$ and converges to p^A . Incumbent A has an advantage in the next election, but this advantage diminishes the further it is from $t = 0$. The case where party B is currently in office is similar; when viewed from date $t = 0$, the probability that party B is in office decreases over time from $p_0^B = 1$ to $1 - p^A$.

Recall from equation (1) that $U_t^i = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i u_{t+k}$, where $\beta_k^i = \delta^k [p_k^i + (1 - p_k^i)\alpha]$. Assuming that party A is in office in period 0, the discount function for party A can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_k^A &= \delta^k [p_k^A + (1 - p_k^A)\alpha] \\ &= \delta^k \{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)[p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^k]\}. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

3 Temptation to Procrastinate

In this section we try to gain some intuition about the decision-making of the ruling parties. It has been shown in the literature that an individual with a present-biased utility function exhibits time-inconsistent behavior, which includes inefficient procrastination of beneficial tasks that carry upfront costs but generate long-lasting future streams of benefits (see, for example, O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). In the current setting, the ruling party prefers the other party, when in office, to implement the policy and bear the upfront implementation cost. The policy implementation game is a war of attrition; each party has an incentive to

wait, hoping that the other party would concede (i.e. implement and bear the policy cost). As a consequence, the party in office will have a present-biased utility function. Therefore, it is also faced with a time-inconsistency problem, and we expect that it may procrastinate.

Our analysis shows that procrastination occurs under certain conditions, and the problem gets worse as implementation cost gets higher. However, even when it does happen, procrastination needs not be indefinite even as we consider an infinite-horizon game. Although the government sometimes procrastinates implementing socially beneficial policies, there exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented, and may be carried out to completion in finite time, especially when the cost is low. Specifically, we show that (i) the policy is entirely implemented immediately in period 0 if the cost of the policy is small; (ii) there may be some finite delay in implementing the policy or the policy is implemented gradually over many periods of time if the cost is in the intermediate range; and (iii) if the cost is high, the policy may never be implemented, but there may also co-exist other equilibria in which the policy is implemented gradually. The equilibrium with gradual policy implementation when the policy implementation cost is high exists precisely because the party in office has present-bias.

We shall show that there is a temptation for the current ruling party to procrastinate due to its present-bias. Suppose we ignore for now the divisibility of the policy. The expected present discounted utility of ruling party i (evaluated at $t = 0$) based on the anticipation that the entire policy is implemented by whoever is in office (not necessarily party i) t periods later is defined as

$$X_t^i \equiv \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_{t+k}^i - \beta_t^i c.$$

Therefore, ruling party i at period 0 (weakly) prefers having the policy implemented in period 0 to having it done in period 1 if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} X_0^i &\geq X_1^i \\ \Leftrightarrow \beta_0^i &\geq (\beta_0^i - \beta_1^i)c \\ \Leftrightarrow \frac{\beta_1^i}{\beta_0^i} &\geq \frac{c-1}{c}. \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

The second inequality is easy to interpret: If the ruling party in period 0 knows that the policy will be implemented by whoever is in office in period 1, it prefers to implement the policy in its entirety immediately if and only if the reduction in benefit by procrastinating, β_0^i , is at least as high as the reduction in cost by doing so, $(\beta_0^i - \beta_1^i)c$. If c is large enough that $\beta_1^i (= \beta_1^i/\beta_0^i) < (c-1)/c$ for $i = A, B$, both parties (whenever they are in office) want to procrastinate. Since $p^A > 1/2$, party B has stonger incentive to procrastinate than party A .

It is shown below that if both parties discount the flow of net social benefit when they are out of office (i.e., $\alpha < 1$), then procrastinating may be preferable for the ruling party since, by doing so, the reduction in cost can outweigh the loss in benefit. We start our analysis from the following lemmas.

Lemma 1 *Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if $X_0^i > 0$, then ruling party i can gain from procrastinating only if party j ($\neq i$) always implements when in office. In other words, provided that $X_0^i > 0$, given that party j always procrastinates, the best response of ruling party i is to always implement.*

Proof. If $X_0^i > 0$, then ruling party i cannot rely on its future selves to implement the policy when in office, precisely because of time-inconsistency. When a future period comes, even if party i is in office, it would face exactly the same situation as in period 0, and so it would procrastinate based on the same reasoning as in period 0. **Q.E.D.**

Lemma 2 *Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if $X_0^i < 0$, then ruling party i always procrastinates.*

Proof. Since perpetual procrastinating yields zero welfare, it is better than implementing, which yields negative welfare. **Q.E.D.**

Lemma 3 *Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if $\beta_1^i > (c-1)/c$, then ruling party i always implements regardless of party j 's implementation strategy.*

Proof. According to equation (6), if $\beta_1^i/\beta_0^i = \beta_1^i > (c-1)/c$, “always implement” is a dynamically consistent strategy for party i , given that party j always implements: Given that

party i would implement whenever it is in office in the future, it is better off implementing immediately if it is currently in office. **Q.E.D.**

Lemma 4 *Considering only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy, if $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c$ but $X_0^i > 0$, ruling party i always procrastinates given that party j always implements, and ruling party i always implements given that party j always procrastinates.*

Proof. If $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c$, then given that party j always implements when in office, it is not optimal for party i to adopt the stationary strategy of always implementing when in office. Therefore, the only stationary pure strategy for party i is to always procrastinate when in office.⁷ Finally, if $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c$ and $X_0^i > 0$, then, from lemma 1, ruling party i always implements given that party j always procrastinates. **Q.E.D.**

4 Subgame Pefect Equilibria

4.1 Non-Cooperative Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

Lemmas 1 through 4 basically provide the intuition that if we consider only stationary pure strategies and indivisible policy then party i would (1) always implement when $\beta_1^i > (c-1)/c$; (2) when $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c$ and $X_0^i > 0$, (a) always implements when party j always procrastinates, and (b) always procrastinates when j always implements; (3) always procrastinates when $X_0^i < 0$. Recall that the welfare of ruling party i at $t = 0$ if it implements the policy immediately is $X_0^i = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i - c = 1 - c + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^i$. Therefore, $X_0^i < 0 \iff (c-1)/c > \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^i / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i$.

Consequently, lemmas 1 through 4 boil down to the following: party i would

- (1) always implement when $(c-1)/c < \beta_1^i$;
- (2) when $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c < \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^i / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i$, (a) always implements when party j always procrastinates; (b) always procrastinates when j always implements;

⁷The strategy is dynamically consistent: If the utility from procrastinating is higher than from implementing today given that the calculation is based on the assumption that party i would implement in the next period (if it is in office), then the value from procrastinating today would be even higher given that the calculation is based on the assumption that party i procrastinates again in the next period (if in office), as the party would face the same situation tomorrow as today.

(3) always procrastinates when $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^i / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i < (c-1)/c$.

Therefore, its implementation strategy depends on the value of $(c-1)/c$.

This subsection formally derives non-cooperative stationary subgame perfect equilibria that confirm the intuition behind lemmas 1 through 4. Subsection 4.2 derives a non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium with gradual implementation. Subsection 4.3 analyzes the effects of party predominance. Subsection 4.4 shows that even in the case where the cost is so high that there exists no non-cooperative equilibrium with successful implementation of the policy, there may exist a “cooperative” equilibrium (with a trigger strategy and a possible punishment strategy) in which the policy is gradually implemented.

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

We derive the condition for the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium here. A mixed-strategy equilibrium exists when each ruling party derives positive utility from implementing the policy in its entirety immediately but would gain from procrastinating if it knows that the other party would implement when in office next period. In such situations, an equilibrium exists such that all ruling parties randomize their policy decisions, and each party is made indifferent between implementing or procrastinating when in office. This corresponds to case (2) mentioned above, namely when $\beta_1^i < (c-1)/c < \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^i / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i$.

Define $\tilde{\beta}_k^i = \delta^k [1 - p_k^j + p_k^j \alpha]$ (where $j \neq i$) as party i 's discount function k periods later given that it is not in office today. Define also $\tilde{X}_0^i = \alpha(1-c) + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \tilde{\beta}_k^i$ as the welfare of party i when party j implements the policy immediately given that j is in office at $t=0$. Let σ^i denote the stationary probability that ruling party i implements the entire policy given that it has not been implemented. Given that the policy has not been implemented, let V^i (\tilde{V}^i) denote the expected welfare of party i (which may or may not be in office) at the beginning of each period when party i (j) was in office last period.

Then, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, V^A and \tilde{V}^A must simultaneously satisfy

$$V^A = \phi^A [\sigma^A X_0^A + (1 - \sigma^A) \delta V^A] + (1 - \phi^A) [\sigma^B \tilde{X}_0^A + (1 - \sigma^B) \delta \tilde{V}^A], \quad (7)$$

$$\tilde{V}^A = (1 - \phi^B) [\sigma^A X_0^A + (1 - \sigma^A) \delta V^A] + \phi^B [\sigma^B \tilde{X}_0^A + (1 - \sigma^B) \delta \tilde{V}^A]. \quad (8)$$

In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, ruling party A is indifferent between implementing and procrastinating, i.e., $X_0^A = \delta V^A$. Substituting this into (8) and solving it for \tilde{V}^A , we obtain

$$\tilde{V}^A = \frac{(1 - \phi^B)X_0^A + \phi^B \sigma^B \tilde{X}_0^A}{1 - \delta \phi^B (1 - \sigma^B)}.$$

Then, we substitute this expression and $X_0^A = \delta V^A$ into (7) to obtain

$$V^A = \frac{[\phi^A - \delta(s-1)(1 - \sigma^B)]X_0^A + \sigma^B(1 - \phi^A)\tilde{X}_0^A}{1 - \delta \phi^B (1 - \sigma^B)}. \quad (9)$$

We apply $X_0^A = \delta V^A$ one more time to equation (9) to get the probability of implementation by ruling party B that renders party A indifferent between implementing and procrastinating when in office:

$$\sigma^{B*} = \frac{1 - \delta s - \delta^2(s-1)}{\delta \left[(1 - \phi^A) \frac{\tilde{X}_0^A}{X_0^A} - \phi^B \right] + \delta^2(s-1)}. \quad (10)$$

Similarly, we obtain the corresponding probability to be chosen by A to make B indifferent between implementing and procrastinating when in office:

$$\sigma^{A*} = \frac{1 - \delta s - \delta^2(s-1)}{\delta \left[(1 - \phi^B) \frac{\tilde{X}_0^B}{X_0^B} - \phi^A \right] + \delta^2(s-1)}.$$

In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, σ^{B*} is chosen by ruling party B so that party A is indifferent between implementing and procrastinating when in office. Thus, in situations where ruling party A 's incentive to procrastinate decreases due to some parametric changes, σ^{B*} must be increased to preserve this indifference. Consequently, if σ^{B*} calculated in (10) is greater than 1, ruling party A will always implement regardless of B 's implementation strategy. On the other hand, if $\sigma^{B*} < 0$, ruling party A will procrastinate regardless of the implementation strategy of party B .

Relationship Between Equilibrium Outcome and Implementation Cost

The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the parties' implementation strategies. It is assumed that $\phi^A > \phi^B$, i.e., party A is a predominant party. The above analysis shows that for party i (where $i = A, B$ and $j \neq i$), when the value of $(c-1)/c$ is in the range marked by $0 < \sigma^{i*} < 1$, ruling party i 's best response given j 's strategy can take any of the following three

alternatives: (1) ruling party i randomizes if it is made indifferent between implementing and procrastinating by suitable choice of $\sigma^{j*} \in (0, 1)$ by j , (2) ruling party i always implements the policy if party j always procrastinates when in office, and (3) ruling party i always procrastinates if j always implements when in office. Knowing these strategies, we can delineate the equilibria according to the value of $(c - 1)/c$ as follow. (The delineation of the equilibria is shown in the lower panel of Figure 1.) **There are five types of equilibria:**

- (i) When $(c - 1)/c < \beta_1^i$ for $i = A, B$, there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium in which A and B both implement;
- (ii) when $\beta_1^B < (c - 1)/c < \beta_1^A$, there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium in which A implements and B procrastinates;
- (iii) when $\beta_1^A < (c - 1)/c < \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^B / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^B$, there are multiple stationary equilibria — there are at least three equilibria: (a) both randomize, (b) A implements and B procrastinates, (c) A procrastinates and B implements;
- (iv) when $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^B / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^B < (c - 1)/c < \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^A / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^A$, there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium in which A implements and B procrastinates, just like in (ii);
- (v) when $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \beta_k^A / \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^A < (c - 1)/c$, there is a unique (stationary) pure strategy equilibrium in which both procrastinate.

We summarize these findings in the following proposition.

Proposition 1 *If the implementation cost of the policy is small, the policy is immediately implemented despite the fact that both parties are present-biased. If the cost is high, neither party implements the policy. If the cost is in the intermediate range, some delay in implementation is expected. The delay may arise because one of the two parties always procrastinates when in office, or because both parties mix their decision as to whether or not they implement the policy when they are in office.*

To demonstrate that the range of $(c - 1)/c$ indicated in Equilibrium Type (iii) above indeed supports multiple equilibria, it proves useful to specialize to $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$, i.e. there exists neither incumbent advantage nor disadvantage, and the parties do not care about social welfare when they are not in office. This helps to simplify the exposition without losing

generality.

Specialization to $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$

In this case, we have $p_k^A = 1 - p_k^B = p^A$ and $p_k^B = 1 - p_k^A = 1 - p^A$ for $k \geq 1$. Therefore,

$$X_0^A = 1 - c + \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta}, \quad (11)$$

$$\tilde{X}_0^A = \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta}. \quad (12)$$

We substitute the above equations and $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$ into (10) to obtain

$$\sigma^{B*} = \frac{\delta p^A - (1 - \delta)(c - 1)}{\delta(1 - p^A)(c - 1)}. \quad (13)$$

It is readily verified that σ^{B*} increases if c decreases or p^A increases. It is necessary for σ^{B*} to increase to reduce ruling party A 's incentive to implement the policy when either one of these pro-implementation forces strengthens.

Delineation of Equilibria when $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$

In the discussion above, we note that if σ^{B*} is calculated from (10) and if $X_0^A = \delta V^A$ is assumed, then $\sigma^{B*} > 1$ signifies that party A always implements regardless of party B 's implementation strategy, and $\sigma^{B*} < 0$ signifies that party A always procrastinates regardless of party B 's strategy. Now, we derive the conditions under which $\sigma^{B*} > 1$ and $\sigma^{B*} < 0$, respectively. It follows directly from (13) that $\sigma^{B*} > 1$ is equivalent to

$$1 - c + \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta} > \frac{\delta}{1 - \delta}(1 - p^A)(c - 1). \quad (14)$$

which can be written as

$$\frac{c - 1}{c} < \delta p^A = \beta_1^A. \quad (15)$$

Under this circumstance, according to lemma 3, ruling party A always implements regardless of party B 's implementation strategy, which means that $X_0^A > \delta V^A$ even when $\sigma^{B*} = 1$.⁸

⁸To prove this, note that when $\sigma^{B*} = 1$, we have from (9) that $V^A = p^A X_0^A + (1 - p^A) \tilde{X}_0^A$. Using this equality, and equations (11) and (12), we obtain $V^A = p^A \left(1 - c + \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta}\right) + (1 - p^A) \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta}$ so that $V^A - X_0^A = (1 - p^A)(c - 1)$. Therefore, the right hand side of (14) is equal to $\delta(V^A - X_0^A)/(1 - \delta)$. Note that the left hand side of (14) is equal to X_0^A from (11). Therefore, (14) is equivalent to $X_0^A > \delta(V^A - X_0^A)/(1 - \delta)$, which is equivalent to $X_0^A > \delta V^A$. Hence, (15) is equivalent to saying that $X_0^A > \delta V^A$ at $\sigma^{B*} = 1$.

On the other hand, it follows from (13) that $\sigma^{B*} < 0$ is equivalent to

$$1 - c + \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta} < 0,$$

which is equivalent to $X_0^A < 0$, i.e. implementing the policy confers negative welfare on ruling party A . This inequality can be rewritten as

$$\frac{c - 1}{c} > \frac{\delta p^A}{1 - \delta(1 - p^A)}. \quad (16)$$

Under this circumstance, ruling party A procrastinates regardless of party B 's implementation strategy.

We can conduct a similar analysis for ruling party B and obtain

$$\sigma^{A*} = \frac{\delta(1 - p^A) - (1 - \delta)(c - 1)}{\delta p^A(c - 1)}.$$

Ruling party B always implements the policy regardless of party A 's implementation strategy if

$$\frac{c - 1}{c} < \delta(1 - p^A) = \beta_1^B,$$

whereas ruling party B always procrastinates regardless of A 's implementation strategy if

$$\frac{c - 1}{c} > \frac{\delta(1 - p^A)}{1 - \delta p^A},$$

which is equivalent to $X_0^B < 0$.

The delineation of equilibria under the special case $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$ is shown in the lower panel of Figure 1.

4.2 Non-cooperative Equilibrium With Gradual Implementation

The existence of mixed strategy equilibrium leads us to suspect that if the policy is divisible then each party may be willing to implement a fraction of the policy when in office given that the other does the same. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium with gradual implementation of the policy if the implementation cost is in the intermediate range where the mixed-strategy equilibrium exists [Type (iii) in subsection 4.1 and in Figure 1]. This “gradual implementation equilibrium” has a one-to-one correspondence with the mixed-strategy equilibrium.

Let us consider a stationary strategy profile such that whenever party i is in office, it implements a fraction a^i of the remainder of the policy of size $\theta \in (0, 1]$. Then, ruling party A 's expected welfare when A was in office in the last period and that when B was in office in the last period can be written, respectively, as functions of θ :

$$\begin{aligned} V^A(\theta) &= (1 - q^A)[a^A\theta X_0^A + \delta V^A((1 - a^A)\theta)] + q^A[a^B\theta \tilde{X}_0^A + \delta \tilde{V}^A((1 - a^B)\theta)], \\ \tilde{V}^A(\theta) &= q^B[a^A\theta X_0^A + \delta V^A((1 - a^A)\theta)] + (1 - q^B)[a^B\theta \tilde{X}_0^A + \delta \tilde{V}^A((1 - a^B)\theta)]. \end{aligned}$$

Let us guess that $V^A(\theta)$ and $\tilde{V}^A(\theta)$ are linear such that $V^A(\theta) = \theta v^A$ and $\tilde{V}^A(\theta) = \theta \tilde{v}^A$ where v^A and \tilde{v}^A are time-invariant. Then, these equations can be rewritten as

$$v^A = (1 - q^A)[a^A X_0^A + (1 - a^A)\delta v^A] + q^A[a^B \tilde{X}_0^A + (1 - a^B)\delta \tilde{v}^A], \quad (17)$$

$$\tilde{v}^A = q^B[a^A X_0^A + (1 - a^A)\delta v^A] + (1 - q^B)[a^B \tilde{X}_0^A + (1 - a^B)\delta \tilde{v}^A]. \quad (18)$$

It is immediate that (17) and (18) correspond term by term to (7) and (8), respectively. Again, focusing on the case in which $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$, we know from the analysis of the mixed-strategy equilibrium that if

$$\begin{aligned} a^A &= \frac{\delta(1 - p^A) - (1 - \delta)(c - 1)}{\delta p^A(c - 1)}, \\ a^B &= \frac{\delta p^A - (1 - \delta)(c - 1)}{\delta(1 - p^A)(c - 1)}, \end{aligned}$$

then both parties are indifferent between implementing and procrastinating, and hence it is ruling party i 's best response that it implements the fraction a^i of the remainder of the policy. It can also be easily verified that V^A and \tilde{V}^A are indeed linear functions of θ as we have guessed. We record this finding in the following proposition.

Proposition 2 *If the cost of the policy is in the intermediate range where the mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, there also co-exists an equilibrium in which the policy is gradually implemented. Each party implements a constant fraction of the remainder of the policy when in office in such a way that the other party is indifferent between implementing and procrastinating when in office.*

4.3 The Effects of Party Predominance

Without loss of generality, we continue to assume that $s = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$ to simplify exposition. As mentioned earlier, equilibria as depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1 will arise when party A is strictly predominant ($p^A > 1/2$). If both parties are perfectly symmetrical (i.e., $p^A = 1/2$), then the threshold implementation costs that demarcate the different equilibria are the same for the two parties: $\delta/2$ and $\delta/(2 - \delta)$ as indicated in Figure 2. The analysis is the same as in the asymmetric case except that it is simpler. So, we do not bother to repeat it. Consequently, under symmetry, there are only three equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the different values of $(c - 1)/c$: (i) when $(c - 1)/c < \delta/2$, both parties implement when in office; (ii) when $\delta/2 < (c - 1)/c < \delta/(2 - \delta)$ there are multiple equilibria including (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium similar to the asymmetric case, (b) A implements and B procrastinates, and (c) B implements and A procrastinates; (iii) when $\delta/(2 - \delta) < (c - 1)/c$, both parties procrastinate. As we depart from symmetry and let party A become predominant, i.e. let p^A increase from $1/2$, both threshold implementation costs increase for party A while they decrease for party B (so a situation illustrated in the lower panel of Figures 2 arises) so that the range of $(c - 1)/c$ that supports multiple equilibria shrinks, as shown in Figure 2. If the parties become so asymmetric that $p^A > \bar{p}$, where

$$\bar{p} = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - \delta}}{\delta} \in \left(\frac{1}{2}, 1\right),$$

then δp^A exceeds $\delta(1 - p^A)/(1 - \delta p^A)$. In this case, the size of the range of $(c - 1)/c$ that supports multiple equilibria shrinks to zero, and so the multiple equilibria shown in Figure 1 will disappear.

Party A 's predominance increases the chance of policy implementation if the original symmetric equilibrium is characterized by procrastination of the predominated party or both, for example when implementation cost is relatively high so that $(c - 1)/c$ is greater than $\delta/(2 - \delta)$. In this case, both parties procrastinate when in office if they are symmetrical, but ruling party A will implement the policy (while ruling party B still procrastinates) if it becomes sufficiently predominant. This is because the range of $(c - 1)/c$ that supports

Equilibrium Type (iv) expands at the expense of that of Equilibrium Type (v) (and Type (iii) for that matter). On the contrary, party A 's predominance may hinder policy implementation if the implementation cost is relatively small so that the original symmetric equilibrium is characterized by immediate implementation by whoever is in office. The explanation is the following. When $(c - 1)/c$ is smaller than $\delta/2$, the policy is implemented immediately if the two parties are symmetrical. As party A becomes sufficient predominant, however, the policy is implemented only when party A is in office because the range of $(c - 1)/c$ that supports Equilibrium Type (ii) expands at the expense of that of Equilibrium Type (i) (and Type (iii) for that matter). Thus, party A 's predominance causes a possible implementation delay in this case.

Now refer to the asymmetric case shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. In the equilibrium where ruling party A implements while ruling party B procrastinates [i.e. (ii) and (iii b) and (iv)], the probability that the policy is implemented in each period conditional on the event that the policy has not been implemented (or "hazard rate") equals p^A , which is greater than $1/2$. This hazard rate of implementation increases as party A becomes more predominant.⁹

In the mixed-strategy equilibrium (iii a), the hazard rate of implementation in each period equals

$$p^A \sigma^{A*} + (1 - p^A) \sigma^{B*} = \frac{\delta - 2(1 - \delta)(c - 1)}{\delta(c - 1)}$$

in each period. In this case, the hazard rate of implementation does not depend on party A 's degree of predominance; an increase in p^A leads to an increase in σ^{B*} and a decrease in σ^{A*} so that parties A and B are kept indifferent between implementing and procrastinating when in office. This hazard rate of implementation, however, increases if δ increases or c decreases.¹⁰

We summarize the above discussion by the following proposition.

⁹Party A 's predominance, however, lowers the probability of policy implementation in the equilibrium where party A always procrastinates when in office while party B always implements when in office (in equilibrium (iii c)). The hazard rate of implementation in each period is $1 - p^A$, which is less than $1/2$, and it decreases as party A becomes more predominant. This is admittedly a perverse outcome, but it does not affect the broad picture that the unconditional probability (on c) of procrastination decreases with party predominance.

¹⁰Note that this result needs to be modified when $s > 1$.

Proposition 3 *For a given value of $(c - 1)/c$, if the original equilibrium is characterized by procrastination of the predominated party or both parties, an increase in party predominance increases the hazard rate of implementation. But if the original equilibrium is characterized by immediate implementation by both parties, an increase in party predominance can lead to procrastination.*

The first part of the proposition is intuitive, given that the source of procrastination is political uncertainty. As party predominance increases, political uncertainty decreases, which should lead to less procrastination. However, the second part of proposition is counter-intuitive, as less political uncertainty can actually lead to more procrastination.

4.4 Cooperative Equilibrium with Gradual Policy Implementation

We have shown that if the implementation cost is large enough, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which neither party implements the policy. In this case, we have $X_0^i < 0$ (see (16) for the case where $s = 1$), for $i = A, B$, so that each ruling party would obtain negative utility from implementing any positive fraction of the policy. Nevertheless, each ruling party wishes that the policy be implemented sometime in the future since X_t^i is positive if t is large enough. To see this claim, first note that

$$X_t^i = \beta_t^i \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\beta_{t+k}^i}{\beta_t^i} - c \right]. \quad (19)$$

In an appendix that is available upon request, we show that the behavior of present-biased preferences is very similar to that of geometric discounting far off in the future, i.e., β_{k+1}^i/β_k^i converges to δ as k tends to infinity. Thus, $\beta_{t+k}^i/\beta_t^i = \prod_{m=0}^{k-1} (\beta_{t+m+1}^i/\beta_{t+m}^i)$ approaches δ^k as t gets larger and larger, and hence the expression in square brackets on the right-hand side of (19) converges to $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k - c$ as t tends to infinity. Since $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k - c > 0$ under the assumption $1/(1 - \delta) > c$, we have $X_t^i = \beta_t^i \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta_{t+k}^i/\beta_t^i) - c \right] > 0$ as t exceeds a certain level. This contrasts sharply with the case of myopia. If the ruling parties are simply myopic (heavily discounting the future with geometric discounting), no ruling party wishes that the policy be implemented in the future if it would obtain negative utility from implementing

today. Time inconsistency arises precisely because the parties are present-biased when they are in office.

It follows from $X_0^i < 0$ that if the ruling party expects all future ruling parties to refrain from implementing the policy, it should also stay away from the policy. That is, no ruling party wants to be the last to implement a positive fraction of the policy. The strategy profile in which $a_t = 0$ for any t is a subgame perfect equilibrium as we have seen. This is certainly bad news for the citizens. Although the policy is socially beneficial, there is a possibility of indefinite procrastination. Does there exist any subgame perfect equilibrium in which some future ruling parties at least implement part of the policy?

To answer this question, first note that no ruling party would want to implement the policy to completion since it would bear a utility loss from implementing the last part of it. Therefore, if the policy is indivisible, then the policy will never be implemented. Thus, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 4 *If the cost of the policy is so high that $X_0^i < 0$, for $i = A, B$, and if the policy is not divisible, then the policy never gets implemented even though it is socially beneficial.*

The proposition says that in case partial implementation of the policy is not feasible, there is indefinite procrastination if the net social benefit is too small.

Indeed, as shown below, if the policy is to be implemented at all, it must be implemented gradually to assure non-negative welfare for every ruling party in the future. Moreover, the policy implementation process must continue indefinitely; otherwise, the ruling party that implements the policy to completion would suffer welfare loss from the part of the policy it implements. The following analysis presents such a gradual implementation equilibrium.

We shall show that when $X_0^i < 0$, a symmetric gradual implementation equilibrium exists if $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$ for any $i = A, B$, i.e., the simple sum of all current and future utility flows is positive for both parties. The situation in which $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$ arises if c is relatively small in the high-cost range. The following lemma implies that $X_k^i > 0$ for all $k \geq 1$ when c takes on a value such that $X_0^i = 0$. This in turn implies, by continuity, that even if $X_0^i < 0$, it is possible that $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$. This happens when c is sufficiently small, as X_k^i decreases in c .

Lemma 5 *If $\alpha < 1$, then $X_t^i > \beta_t^i X_0^i$ for any $t \geq 1$.*

The proof of Lemma 5 is relegated to the Appendix. Under the usual geometric discounting preferences such that $\beta_t^i = \delta^t$, X_t^i would be equal to $\beta_t^i X_0^i$. Under the present-biased preferences, however, the current ruling party puts a disproportionately high weight on the cost incurred in the current period, and so X_0^i is disproportionately small.

Now, consider the stationary action profile, symmetric between the two parties, such that regardless of which party is in office, $a_t = a(1-a)^t$ for some constant $a \in (0, 1)$. According to this action profile, both parties implement the fraction a of the remainder of the policy whenever they are in office, and this process continues indefinitely. Consequently, the relevant welfare for the party in office in period t as evaluated in that period equals

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} [a(1-a)^k X_k^i]. \quad (20)$$

Lemma 6 *Suppose $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$. Then, there exists $\bar{a} \in (0, 1)$ such that for any $a \in (0, \bar{a})$, the relevant welfare for the party in office in period t given by (20) is positive.*

Proof: We first notice that $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-a)^k X_k^i$ converges to $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$ as $a \rightarrow 0$. Thus, there exists an \bar{a} such that for any $a \in (0, \bar{a})$, $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-a)^k X_k^i > 0$, and hence $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} a(1-a)^k X_k^i > 0$.

Q.E.D.

Can this gradual implementation scheme with $a \in (0, \bar{a})$ be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium? The answer is “yes” as the following strategy profile is subgame perfect.

$$a_t = \begin{cases} a(1-a)^t & \text{if there has been no deviation from } a_k = a(1-a)^k \text{ for all } k \leq t-1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (21)$$

Hence, we obtain the following proposition.

Proposition 5 *If the cost of the policy is sufficiently high that $X_0^i < 0$ for $i = A, B$, but sufficiently small that $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} X_k^i > 0$ for $i = A, B$, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which every ruling party implements a constant fraction of the remainder of the policy so that the implementation process goes on indefinitely.*

Proof: We show here that the strategy profile (21) is subgame perfect. Since indefinite procrastination is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we need only show that no ruling party has an incentive to deviate from the prescribed actions when there has been no deviation in the past. According to the prescribed action profile, if there has been no deviation, the ruling party in period t is to choose $a_t = a(1 - a)^t$, receiving positive welfare from its action (Lemma 6). If it chooses some other level of a_t , on the other hand, the equilibrium path would switch to the “punitive equilibrium” of indefinite procrastination, making the present value of future utility flows zero. Since the utility flow from choosing a positive a_t for the ruling party in period t is negative, the discounted sum of utility flows would be non-positive if it chooses any a_t other than $a(1 - a)^t$. Hence, the ruling party in period t is better off conforming to the equilibrium path than choosing any other levels of a_t . Therefore, it will choose $a_t = a(1 - a)^t$ if there has been no deviation before period t . **Q.E.D.**

This cooperative equilibrium exists because both parties have preferences characterized by present-bias. Based on the analysis in this paper, we can explain a ruling party’s possible procrastination in two different ways. First, it may prefer the other party to implement the policy in the near future, rather than implementing it itself. Second, the present value of utility flows from implementing the policy may become greater if the policy is implemented some time in the future due to present-bias. The first one was a predominant cause of the mixed-strategy (and non-cooperative gradual implementation) equilibrium derived in subsection 4.1. The second one, on the other hand, is the primary cause of this cooperative gradual implementation equilibrium. A ruling party has an incentive to implement part of the policy only when a significant portion of the policy is sufficiently delayed so that the entire process of policy implementation yields a positive present value of utility flows.

5 Concluding Remarks

We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. Present-bias arises because a party’s probability of getting elected in the future is less than one, and because

it puts more weight on the flow of net social benefit of the policy when it is in office than when it is not. As a result, the ruling party in a two-party system often procrastinate about implementing socially beneficial policies that carry upfront costs but yield long-term benefits. Another way to look at it is that a ruling party's implementation of the policy today confers positive intertemporal externalities on future rival ruling parties, leading to too little implementation.

We find that there is an array of equilibria, which can be categorized according to the cost-benefit ratio of the policy. The procrastination problem tends to get more serious as the cost-to-benefit ratio gets higher. When the cost is relatively low, there is no procrastination problem. When the cost is intermediate, the parties are in a war of attrition. As the ruling party cannot capture all the future benefits from implementing the policy, there is certain degree of reluctance to implement it immediately or completely. There are various forms of procrastination, such as having a probability of implementation less than one in each period, or gradual implementation by all ruling parties. When the cost is relatively high, the policy may be procrastinated indefinitely, though there may co-exist equilibria in which the policy is implemented gradually in a cooperative manner.

Our theory predicts that a government with a more predominant party tends to procrastinate less. It also predicts that the predominant party procrastinates less than the predominated party. Finally, it predicts that socially desirable policies are more likely to be implemented gradually rather than immediately when the degree to which one party predominates the other is lower. It would be interesting to test these hypotheses.

One can easily derive corresponding results when the government is faced with implementing a policy that confers immediate benefits and demands future flows of costs. In this setting, it is expected that a present-biased government may implement a policy which is not socially beneficial. For example, the ruling party may run too large a budget deficit.

A possible extension of this research is to endogenize the probability of a party being elected. In our model, citizens are far-sighted and wish that the government implement the policy entirely as soon as possible. If this effect dominates, parties would have more incentive

to implement the policy if the probability of being re-elected is endogenized; consequently, the equilibrium delay would be shortened. In reality, however, it is equally plausible that at least part of the citizenry is myopic in their voting behavior so that the ruling party's probability of being re-elected is positively correlated with the net flow of social cost resulting from implementing the policy today. In such a case, parties may have less incentive to implement the policy, so that the equilibrium delay may be lengthened. In any event, endogenizing the ruling party's probability of being re-elected would not change the basic message of this paper.

In addition, this model can be easily applied to address specific policy issues, such as trade liberalization, reduction of budget deficit, or social security reform, by adding more structure.

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 5:

To prove Lemma 5, it suffices to show that $\beta_{t+k}^i/\beta_t^i > \beta_k^i$, or $\beta_{t+k}^i > \beta_t^i\beta_k^i$, for any $t \geq 1$ and $k \geq 1$, since $X_t^i = \beta_t^i \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta_{t+k}^i/\beta_t^i) - c \right]$ and $X_0^i = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_k^i - c$. Indeed, we only show that $\beta_{t+k}^A > \beta_t^A\beta_k^A$ since party B 's counterpart is obvious. Recall equation (5) and define

$$\begin{aligned} f(\alpha) \equiv & \alpha + (1 - \alpha)\{p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^{t+k}\} \\ & - [\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\{p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^t\}][\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\{p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^k\}]. \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to see that $\beta_{t+k}^A > \beta_t^A\beta_k^A$ if and only if $f(\alpha) > 0$.

Now,

$$\begin{aligned} f(0) &= p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^{t+k} - [p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^t][p^A + (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^k] \\ &= p^A(1 - p^A)[1 - (s - 1)^t][1 - (s - 1)^k] > 0, \end{aligned}$$

since $-1 < s - 1 < 1$. In addition, $f(1) = 0$. Moreover, since

$$f''(\alpha) = -2[1 - p^A - (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^t][1 - p^A - (1 - p^A)(s - 1)^k] < 0,$$

the function f is a concave function. Thus, we have shown that $f(\alpha) > 0$ for any $\alpha \in [0, 1)$.

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


Figure 1. Implementation Strategies and Subgame Perfect Equilibria (case where $s=1$, $\alpha=0$ and $p^A > 1/2$)




Figure 2. Effects of $p^A \uparrow$ on the threshold costs, starting from $p^A = 1/2$. It is assumed that $s=1$ and $\alpha = 0$.